Last week, Yanis Varoufakis, Srećko Horvat and some others launched DiEM25; the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, which has the objective of “one simple of radical idea; to democratise Europe”. Now, the movement is very young, and has little more than a 3-hour long launch event, a press conference, a few notable names and a manifesto to show for itself. So don’t get me wrong, this isn’t Europe’s messiah come to save it in the darkest of hours, not for now at least. However it’s aim, which to most democrats should seem fairly acceptable, has already been attacked and denounced as something leftist and radical; something completely beyond the pale. Others have merely cast doubt on the movement’s likelihood of achieving its goal. So really, how radical is the idea of making a European democracy?

A short history of the democratic deficit

Those familiar with the history of the European Union understand that in terms of democracy, the EU is short. A ‘democratic deficit’ it is referred to on the one hand, others call it technocratic, and Mr Varoufakis himself says that talking of “a  democratic deficit in Europe is like talking of an oxygen deficit on the moon; it doesn’t exist”. The DiEM25 manifesto has chosen to explain the lack of democracy thus so:

“the EU began life as a cartel of heavy industry (later co-opting farm owners) determined to fix prices and to redistribute oligopoly profits through its Brussels bureaucracy. The emergent cartel, and its Brussels-based administrators, feared the demos and despised the idea of government-by-the-people.”

Now, regardless of whether you buy this exact explanation, it’s undoubtedly true that the initial decades of European integration had no democratic element whatsoever; for a project with stated political aims it’s quite astounding. The European Parliament was not democratically elected until 1979. That’s over 20 years since the Treaties of Rome, and almost 30 since the Treaty of Paris, which founded the Coal & Steel Community which started this all. Now we in Britain like to often describe the European Project as a purely economic one, hence Prime Minister Cameron’s reforms, however from the way the EU has grown, you’d be forgiven for thinking that the rest of the EU also was lulled into that false idea.

You see the fact is, that the EU has for a while been teetering between what is essentially an intergovernmental organisation – like the WTO – and a supranational one, of which, there’s no real comparison. For me, Germany during the 19th Century is always the closest comparison; numerous smaller states giving up parts of their sovereignty in order to build a greater whole. However, unlike the German case, and despite what some eurosceptics might say, there’s no overwhelmingly dominant power which is forcing us all together, as Prussia did in the 19th Century. Regardless, as the European Project has shifted more and more powers away from the national level to the European one, this growth of supranational executive power has not been matched by the same level of supranational legislative power; democracy. It simply has not. The major decision making bodies – Ecofin, the European Council, the Eurogroup – none of them are checked and held to account by a democratically elected body. Neither is the legislative in the European law-making process – the European Parliament – a fully functioning legislature with the powers a sovereign parliament should have. It can’t propose legislature, and is not consulted on all decisions taken at the European Level. Varoufakis likens it to “taking our sovereignty, and putting it in a black hole”, instead on transferring it to a different level.

Technocracy in Europe

So this is DiEM25’s radical idea. Let’s establish a European level democracy, where the parliamentarians in Brussels actually get to act as parliamentarians should, criticise the government where they go wrong, scrutinise and improve legislation where it’s unsatisfactory and propose bills where the executive is too unimaginative to try. It’s not just about the powers of parliament. The European Parliament first of all is based on a system of federating national level parties, which does nothing to integrate the European demos. The executive levels of the European Union are left unchecked and govern behind closed doors. There’s a reason why people feel so disconnected from European decision making, despite those decisions impacting around 500 million lives. Because people rightly think they don’t get a say in what happens. And people can often feel like that at the national level anyway. It is this feeling of helplessness and powerlessness which has been correctly identified as fuelling European nationalism and populism. The unstoppable march of Sparpolitik, the neoliberal consensus pervading every corner of Europe and being spread by an unaccountable and unchangeable executive. This is the source of Europe’s problems, says DiEM25’s manifesto, and this is what drives the EU to ruin.

Now despite this, the movement begun on 9th February at the Berlin Volksbühne has already been peddled in different ways by conservatives, people who support the status quo and people who dislike initiatives who have even the slightest whiff of the left about them. Carnegie Europe published a scathing article on 9th February in response to the plans of DiEM25, calling their ideas ‘leftist snake oil’, and saying that there will be an ‘overseasoning’ of conspiracy theories at the Berlin event, as well as ‘faux common sense’. Now, there are a series of problems with what the writer, Jan Techau, suggests; firstly, that populists always propose simple solutions to complex problems. Regardless of whether you think DiEM25 is a populist movement or not, democratising European decision making is by no means a simple solution, or we would have it already. Furthermore, it no where in the manifesto suggests that this will immediately solve all our problems. Instead, what the manifesto says is that it will provide a third way to our current major problem of a disintegrating Europe; instead of carrying on as we are, or surrendering to national democracy which in Europe in particular is not able to confront the challenges of the modern world, how about we change the Europe we are opting for, so that it doesn’t mean we continue with an authoritarian, faceless juggernaut. Instead, we actually provide our elected European leaders who make the decisions the power and resources to change course in Europe, and on top of that, provide the means with which to judge their performance, so that when election time comes around we can remove them if they do not meet the challenge. Secondly, the Techau does much apologising for the sorry state of European politics. DiEM25 has called the EU a democracy free zone. Whilst this is more rhetoric than fact (measuring democracy isn’t exactly straightforward), making excuses for what happened to Greece during the summer last year, the insulting lack of transparency in important meetings that decide the fate of nations, or the all-too-present policy of German inspired and demanded austerity in Europe is not the way to make anyone believe that Europe is democratic enough. That phrase alone should make it clear why there’s a problem here.

Something I really cannot fathom, is why the Mr Techau constantly refers to this as a Marxist movement. I mean, it’s just plainly lying to people; there is literally nothing particularly Marxist, leftist or radical about a movement to provide the European executive with a powerful, legitimate and effective democratic check. Decision makers being able to answer the questions of: what are your powers? Who gave you those powers? How are you using those powers? And how can we remove you from power? Techau’s assumption that these aims are somehow radical and unacceptable really underlines the problem in Brussels; either they know they can’t face democracy or they don’t understand why we should – wither way they don’t want to. It has been referred to as a contempt for the democratic process. Regardless of if that’s true, democracy has certainly been excluded from the highest realms of power as is the case in no national European democracy. Simply demanding the opportunity to work together as a people, as a united demos unshackled on the European level from our national restrictions, acting together to reject German Sparpolitik and demand a new course. These are the radical ideas that only the left would suggest. And really this is the worst part in my mind about this article, that Techau agrees with DiEM25’s overarching ambition:

“At the heart of the manifesto is an idea that is as sound as it is politically ambitious: a plan to create, within ten years, a new legal foundation for the EU, built on a freely elected pan-European parliament that would cooperate with national legislatures to better represent the will of the people of Europe at the European level. The starting point of this foundation would be a new constitutional process conducted by a European assembly comprised of representatives of national, regional, and municipal delegates elected from across Europe.”

If this plan is so sound, why is it outrageous when coming from the left? The article cites the manifesto’s “condescending language” as reason to distrust the movement but no where do I see language that is unreasonable or somehow unnecessary. The tone is firm and no-nonsense; this is an issue right at the core of Europe’s problem and yes the fact is still is an issue is all the more reason to be angry and take this seriously. The people in Brussels may not actually have a contempt for democracy but the outcome is just the same – utterly political decisions being taken by unelected technocrats, who act as if their decisions are a matter of course and undebateable.

Democracy in Europe

The fact that a far more intelligently written article from what seems to me a far more reputable source – Social Europe – comes to a similar conclusion about DiEM25 is cause for concern. Of course, there are genuine, intellectual arguments for why the movement might fail, which do not simply amount to bashing the left and calling everyone Marxists. The SE article by Thomas Fazi, called a critique, certainly has points to consider. The fact is Fazi, like Habermas, Varoufakis and DiEM25, once argued for the creation of a European demos and a European democracy. But the writer has his doubts; his criticism stems from doubts that such a programme could be achievable or successful considering the nature of Europe.

“The main flaws of [DiEM25’s] position was its inability to truly envision the ‘supranational democracy’ it was calling for”

As explained, the fully fledged European democracy would rest on the concept of a fully empowered European parliament, with an overhauled executive responsible to that parliament and a European President, who leads that government. Jürgen Habermas has made the point that the European Council would have to be abolished, and that the law-making process would have to change to include the Parliament and Council of the EU as equal players in every vote. According to Fazi however, there are problems with this.

“I harboured serious doubts about the extent to which such a system of supranational democracy could be made truly representative and respectful of the needs of the weaker states of the Union.”

The question of respecting the needs of smaller states will certainly be a point for the Constitutional Assembly envisaged by DiEM25 to consider, as all federal states have to consider how to balance the powers of their constituent states. In The Lure of Technocracy Habermas also discusses this point, and arrives at the conclusion that this is the purpose of the second chamber in a federal system; whilst the lower chamber acts as a representation of the demos as a whole, the upper chamber represents the states of the Union on equal terms, each state with equal power – the Council of the EU. The only problem we have here is making the two chambers’ power equal in the law-making process, and tying the executive branch directly to these two bodies.

A good question that Fazi puts to those in favour of European democracy is the question of legitimacy and power sharing. He accurately points out that there’s some unclear language in DiEM25’s manifesto – how are we supposed to both increase the powers of the European level and the national parliaments? Surely there’s some trade off there, and certain policy areas, mainly economically focussed, would have to be transferred to the European level. Now the simple, but unsatisfactory answer there, is that only decisions which cannot be effectively taken at the national level are taken at the European one. Fazi writes this himself in his own book, The Battle for Europe:

“The powers exercised at the European level should be confined solely to those issues that cannot be managed effectively at national level, with higher tiers of government acting only when the common interest requires it”

However this doesn’t solve the major issue, because if monetary and fiscal policy need to be determined at the European level, will the European demos being created accept the legitimacy of a European Parliament, which it believes stands for the interests of people across the continent? Fazi’s short answer is, unlikely. His example of the Troika’s actions in the summer merely being legitimated by the now empowered European Parliament however is not good enough; firstly, if the parliament was sufficiently powerful, would it have been made up in the way it currently is and would its parties vote as they currently do? I doubt it. DiEM25 wants cross-border parties, not conglomerates of national parties, and given sigificant powers, the Parliament may have been able to revise the terms of the Greek bailout. However, this assumes we are bailing Greece out, which under the desired system, would not be happening. There would be no German money being leant to Greece, but transferred to support part of the Union. Yes oversight of reforming the Greek economy would have to happen, but the focus would not be on Sparpolitik and repaying debts.

The fundamental ‘differences’ between Germany and Greece however still remain. Why would Greek voters trust German voters to have their best interests at heart, as is the supposed case in a purely Greek democracy? Well this is a more difficult issue, but once again I refer to Habermas. He argued that ultimately, the necessary steps need to be taken to form not just a European demos, but a public sphere in which German affairs are European affairs, which makes them Greek and British as well. News is reported with the same level of importance and mutual interest as national affairs are. Culture, society and so on would also have to be cross-border, in order to foster in European the feeling that they all share the same problems, all have the same goals and should not distrust each other.

The question is, is this radical? Perhaps. Creating a European society where we can all trust in a single Parliament taking decisions at the European level is certainly a long process. However, as Fazi wrote in his article, this is already the case, except that decisions are made Europe-wide but only technocratically, not democratically. There is no changing course, no participation of the demos and no connection ultimately between the people and the powerful. Srećko Horvat wrote in an article on Tuesday that without a European democracy, the fate of Europe in the 1930s could revisit us once more. Now that may seem ridiculous to some, but when considered, there’s no reason why not. Borders going up everywhere, distrust abound, nationalist rising up across the continent. Ultimately, I believe that whilst European democracy without a European public sphere won’t provide a perfect answer, nor will it solve all Europe’s problems. But it will give us a significant jolt in the right direction, that may result in a better society for us all, and diffuse the mounting hatred of the far-right. Whether this can be done by 2025 however, is another matter entirely.

Sources: Social Europe, Carnegie Europe, New Europe, The Guardian