This is an essay written in early 2017, on the subject of imperialism. Imperialism has several meanings and connotations depending on the perspective you approach the subject from, and in this essay I discuss them in an attempt to answer the question of whether Europe can be considered an ‘imperial power’ in the sense that we refer to the Pax Americana and American imperialism, and that we have done so with Europe in the 19th Century. This question, I believe, is at the heart of contemporary questions of international political economy, and goes to the heart of what Europeans want from the European Project – and which Europeans are hoping for which ends. Crucially, the ideas I outline in this essay provide some context for the place in which I situate the European Union in the international system; where it is today, and where it could go.

In what sense, if any, can the European Union be regarded as an imperial power?

The European Union is among the most profound achievements of the last century; in many ways, it has changed the face of Europe and its place in the world, from one of violence, strife and oppression, to a beacon of ‘peace…democracy and…prosperity’[1]. By the fin-de-siècle, commentators were hailing the ‘New European Century’ and a ‘beacon of light in a troubled world’[2]. The latter commentator also argued that Europe’s aim was to seek ‘harmony, not hegemony’. This raises a key question, namely, the nature of Europe’s relationship with Imperial power. Marquand describes this self-congratulation as reminiscent of the unenlightened and imperialistic vocation that dazzled Europeans in the 19^th-Century[3]. Despite this comment, the idea imperialism and ‘empire’ has experienced something of a revival in recent years, and publications have specifically aimed the term ‘empire’ at the European Union[4]. If ‘empire’ is to be used to describe Europe, then it must be examined whether this is true and in what sense.

There are two main definitions of imperialism, on the one hand broad and historically grounded, on the other narrow and theoretically grounded. The broad definition, from Cooper, might be “the imposition of alien laws and systems of administration”[5]. This historically rests on the assumption of total control over a certain territory and the power to enforce alien laws and administration – often through military force. The theoretical sense is a product of Marxist theory, originating from Lenin’s writings on Imperialism[6], in which he wrote about a new stage in the development of capitalism. Capitalist imperialism relies on the vast economic power accumulated in the highly developed capitalist states flooding abroad speculatively in order to prolong their expansion and dominant position in capitalist society and the wider world[7]. This concept has been refined by Marxist scholars over the years, so that we can say economic power in a state becomes so concentrated that there is no more competition, and instead capital must search abroad to profit further and compete over the world market; the world’s resources and people are fought over by the capitalist classes as they were territorially the European imperial powers [8]. We are in a similar era of monopoly-based industrial-financial capital today, as in Lenin’s day. What joins the two concepts of imperialism is the specific relationship of domination and subordination; strong ruling over weak.

The concept of imperialism used in this essay however combines these two dimensions of imperial power, a view advanced by Harvey; that imperialism at its heart is the intersection of geopolitical and economic power, and the interests behind them. Harvey originally argued this to explain the Iraq War – both geopolitical and economic interests were at stake, the concepts being deeply intertwined[9]. In 2014, Callinicos argued imperialist capital relies on states to defend its interests at home and abroad, and the states rely on that same capital to defend themselves from their rivals abroad, as the backbone of modern military[10]. It is through this prism that the question of European imperialism can be best understood: whether it exists and to what extent. Related to this question is one of hegemony and its place in a truly imperial power. Hegemony goes beyond domination, in that power is cemented not only by force but also consent, through ideas and beliefs of the dominated, so to maintain the consent of the subordinated and the perceived legitimacy of imperial rule[11]. With this grounding, we look at the different aspects of imperialism in the world and how Europe fits into them.

The European Union for much of its history has shied away from what is traditionally considered ‘High Politics’, comprised of defence, diplomacy and foreign policy – used to promote geopolitical. This is a result of the rejection of the initial European attempt to engage with High Politics. When the European Defence Community was voted down in 1954 by the Assemblée Nationale, High Politics was placed to one side to ensure the show to go on; nevertheless, the ‘no’ from Paris was interpreted as a ‘not yet’, Europe unwilling to give up its role in determining world affairs permanently[12]. The Maastricht Treaty inaugurated the CFSP as the ‘Second Pillar’ of the Union, the first tasked with projecting European power in geopolitical terms across the wider world. As Ryner and Cafruny highlight, in recent history the establishment of a European arm of foreign policy is all the more significant as geopolitics has returned to the European continent, immediately in the form of escalating tensions with Russia[13].

The CFSP has proved largely ineffective from its inception. Already by the 1996 summit leading to the Amsterdam Treaty, the conclusion was that Europe’s failure to control the unfolding disasters in the Yugoslavia was due to a foreign policy unsupported by military power; the WEU was still very basic and crucially subordinate to NATO[14]. Militarily, Europe has intervened on several occasions since the CFSP was created: throughout the 1990s in the Balkans, and in the Middle East culminating with Iraq 2003. However, these operations were all under the direction of the US through NATO. Beyond these American-led operations, foreign policy has been fragmented and incoherent; defence spending in the 2007-2016 period has diverged rapidly, with eastern states vastly increasing spending and southern states’ spending plummeting[15]. Mali and Sierra Leone gained no European support. The débâcle in Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates the absence of a coherent, independent European foreign policy. With Germany unilaterally recognising separatist states in 1992, the Yugoslav situation was more reminiscent of 19^th Century European imperialism on the continent, certainly not the imperial foreign policy of a union[16]. Since the 1990s Europe has become increasingly willing to undertake joint military enterprises, but crucially, still in close coordination with NATO; for example, the intervention in Libya 2011, the Macedonia peacekeeping mission 2003 and the naval operations near Somalia, beginning in 2008.

The CSDP has enabled the deployment of these ‘EU Battlegroups’ abroad, however, at the base of this capacity are still NATO structures[17]. In this way, it can be argued that European geopolitical manoeuvres have served American imperial interests much more than any European entity; European expansion in Eastern Europe was spearheaded by NATO rather than supported by it, demonstrated by the fact all acceding states to the Union were members of NATO first[18]; this has run in parallel with neoliberalism, as an American-led economic model, also leading the vanguard of the advance into the former Soviet sphere of influence[19]. Explanation of this is crucial to the wider understanding of imperialism; Carchedi predicted in 2001 that as Europe’s economic weight in the world grew, so would the importance of its military[20]. Since economic power and military power reinforce one another, it seemed a matter of course that a European economic superpower would be accompanied by a similarly powerful military. This hasn’t materialised, for several reasons. One is the set-back of European economic power over the course of the crisis of the eurozone since 2010; another key factor however is highlighted by Ryner & Cafruny, that Germany as Europe’s leading power, while providing the economic muscle, has not and still does not meet this in terms of military, or its assertiveness on the international stage, and furthermore there is not state in Europe which does[21]. The absence of a hegemonic role played by the Union’s economic leader means that for the time being, European foreign policy, if coherent at all, is led by the US, not an imperial force all of its own.

This section discusses imperialism in terms of economic power. Europe is increasingly being praised as the ‘soft-power’ counterpart to the US[22], using its wealth and economic strength as a force in world affairs. Bauman correctly argued that modern imperialism rests less on territorial control today than it does control of the resources there[23]. This in mind, Carchedi argues that international trade organisations’ ultimate purpose is to facilitate the search for maximum profits by powerful commercial capital in the core states of global capitalism[24]. Europe fully engages in this practice, beginning with the successive rounds of negotiation in GATT, what is today the WTO. The WTO embodies the principle of free trade, meaning crucially the free movement of capital and goods; Europe has benefited from trade liberalisation immensely, being the second largest trade power in 2015 after China[25]. Beyond this global, US-led system of economic imperialism, the Union has developed several arms of its own capable of advancing an imperial agenda. DG Enlargement is responsible for Europe’s economic relations with the states surrounding the Union, crucially, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Alongside this is DG DEVCO, responsible for European economic relations with the developing world. The primary objective of both of these is to expand European influence over the developing world, including several former European colonies[26]. A key element of the Union’s founding in Rome Treaties was to create structured relations between post-Imperial Europe and the former colonies; these were hailed by Walter Hallstein in 1969 as escaping the label of neo-imperialism due to the purely economic nature of these relations, for the purposes of raising up the Global South[27]. This judgement is problematic however: crucially, the focus of development shifted in the late 1970s-1980s from import-substitution to liberalisation, accompanying the transition to neoliberalism. Opening themselves up to imports of goods and capital from Europe, it can be clearly discerned, has led to rapidly deteriorating terms of trade between the core and periphery of the global economy, as they become almost totally reliant on exporting raw materials and food to the core in return for industrial goods, in blatant neo-imperialism[28].

Furthermore, thanks to Europe’s export-orientated agricultural policy, tonnes of cheap European food floods onto the world markets and undermines the position of producers in the peripheral economies; in effect Europe dumps its food in Africa as China does its steel in Europe[29]. The developing world is trapped in a relationship where it is economically dependent on Europe and the West for its entire economic health; European agreements with ACP countries have been a key part of maintaining this relationship[30]. In particular, the Cotonou Agreement, changed the nature of EU development policy, distancing itself from Hallstein’s focus on economic criteria, to also include ‘good governance’ conditions[31]. ENP in Ukraine and the Southern Mediterranean follows the same principles as for the wider world: prioritising neoliberal objectives such as privatisation, deregulation and macroeconomic prudence, undermining the economic position of the developing countries. Nevertheless, when considering these factors alongside the geopolitical dimension, European imperialism can be considered as a failure in Europe’s immediate periphery; much of it has now become a conflict zone, and with European power expelled by pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine and fanatical jihadists in the Middle East and North Africa[32]. At the heart of this is the lopsided nature of European imperial power, the economic arm of which can be viewed as ‘overextended’[33], in the sense that to maintain hegemonic imperial relations with peripheral countries, a strong geopolitical strategy supported by military force would be necessary. This is the failure of Carchedi’s prediction to come true returning to haunt the European imperialists – imperial power requires both hard and soft approaches.

This analysis has so far considered Europe as a single entity and has looked at whether Europe engages in imperial relations with states outside of the Union. At the same time, Europe in many ways resembles a historical, formal empire, in that it has integrated almost the entire European continent into a single political structure. It is to this that we now turn. Having previously stated DG Enlargement’s objectives[34], its imperial attitude and approach to acceding countries is blatantly obvious. During the 1990s with the CEECs, a core arm of Enlargement was PHARE, the tool used nominally for financial assistance, but also the extraction of information for use by the Union[35]. Today, the equivalent for the states in former-Yugoslavia are the ‘Stabilisation & Association Agreements’, with €11.7bn funding between 2014-2020. Whilst the official list of objectives for these funds is institution-building, the development of civil society, enterprise and so on, these can be taken collectively as the construction of a liberal, western-orientated administrative class which will sustain the pro-Union consensus in those states. Accompanying this is the necessary implementation of acquis communautaire, the full body of European law, which fully converts a state to a western, market-based liberal democracy; implementation of the acquis is non-negotiable[36]. The other side of coin is the opening up of acceding states’ markets to free trade and the free flow of capital; in the 1990s with Eastern Europe, this was known as ‘shock therapy’, and opened up those economies to their subordination to Western capital, in particular German capital[37]. German capital now occupies a central position in the Eastern European economy, which complements its leading role in the EMU, giving it domination over Southern Europe[38]. Europe in a way then has two internal peripheries[39].

The follow up question is, does this make Europe an empire in the traditional sense? Scholars from across the spectrum have weighed in on this. When considering the case of Eastern Enlargement, Zielonka has argued that the design was ‘truly imperialist’, designed to assume complete control over developments in post-communist Europe[40]. In a more critical vein, Marquand argues that the integration of these post-communist states was reminiscent of India under the British Raj[41]. Turning south, Tsoukalis wrote that the troika governing every aspect of Greek life, is the kind of treatment reserved for the colonies of a ‘bygone’ age of imperialism[42].

There are two non-imperial theories which warrant examination. One is the ‘pacific federation’, conceptualised by Kant in 1795[43]; which Bauman referenced in arguing Europe is capable of ushering in the Kantian form of international relations, having put into practice several of the measures required for such a transition[44]. On the other hand, there is the inter-state federation proposed by Hayek in 1939[45]; a more critical comparison used by Streeck, calling Europe an ‘empire of market economics’[46], and Anderson, who argued that interstate federalism was supposed to subject Europe to diktats of free-market economics, forming a Hayekian ‘Catallaxy’[47]. These two strands of thought differ little substantially, with both their core relying on the idea of commerce and transnational economic power providing the basis for pacification of European states. One major difference is Kant’s acceptance that this pacification is purely one of inter-state conflict; he recognised that conflict between classes and interests would continue, which could also spill into war[48]. The Marxist interpretation could be that the pacific federation is bound together by the power of capital, whose interests prevail over those of lower classes. When looking at Europe, there are key similarities with the Kantian or Hayekian federations – peaceful expansion, with economics placed at the heart of this process from the Treaty of Paris onwards. The power of capital then has bound Europe together, pacifying inter-state conflict, but reinforcing class-conflict. Kautsky’s argument that, like economic monopoly is produced from competition, so a federation would form of the greatest imperial powers, seems in some way to fit the Union[49]. However, the peaceful analysis lacks an element with which to tie it to imperialism; this is that the free-trade empire can only advance under the cover of an equal military power. In Europe, the general peace has been enforced by the American military, and it is from this that the commercially-underpinned peace has been allowed to take root. Without the US military, it is conceivable that the European Union may have collapsed long ago; in this we can conceive Europe as a key pillar of the American imperium, rather than as a self-standing empire of its own. Europe lives ‘in the Empire’s shadow’[50]. This is also why European hegemony is non-existent; despite domination by German capital’s immense economic power, these imperial relations are not characterised by hegemony. The hegemonic role is still filled by the US, being able to combine geopolitical and economic imperialism into a single strategic vision. Nevertheless, liberal empire as a combination of Marxist imperium and Kantian/Hayekian federation, is not a contradiction in terms, but a living reality in Europe. Peace is underpinned by economic power which binds Europe across borders, but it reflects a continent whose capitalist core dominates its peripheries, encompassing them economically and territorially, and guaranteed by American military muscle.

In conclusion, it is difficult not to regard Europe as an imperial power; it engages in both geopolitical and economic imperial relations across the world, using its economic might and in many cases deploying its military in support of this. As Carchedi noted, how could a body emerging from the integration of former imperial powers become something entirely different in nature?[51] In Europe however, there is a split, hence having treated the subjects separately in this analysis. Europe does not balance its economic weight with any kind of equivalent military power, perhaps having itself fallen into the belief that the Kantian peace is a result of economic relations alone. Such a misunderstanding of power goes all the way to the top, with Germany dominating the Union but not acting as its hegemon; as a result, European imperialism is an unstable one, and still in many ways subordinated to the American imperium which wields its economic and military power in tandem, creating hegemony. In some ways, Europe must be regarded as more of an unstable pillar of the Pax Americana, rather than as a true Pax Europaea, for the peace is American, created and maintained.

[1] Tsoukalis, 2016 p.1

[2] Leonard, 2005 p.4, Rifkin, 2004 p.382

[3] Marquand, 2011 p.24

[4] Anderson, 2011 p.68-9

[5] Cooper, 2001

[6] Lenin, 1921

[7] Ibid. p.20-2, 30-2, 70-1

[8] Callinicos, 1991 p.6

[9] Harvey, 2003 p.26

[10] Callinicos, 2014 p.18

[11] Bates, 1975 p.351

[12] Van Middelaar, 2014 p.158, 159

[13] Ryner & Cafruny, 2017 p.167

[14] Carchedi, 2001 p.15

[15] Stanley-Lockman & Wolf, 2016 p.2

[16] Van Middelaar, 2014 p.198-9

[17] Document on EU-NATO Consultation (2003)

[18] Anderson

[19] Ryner & Cafruny, 2017 p.180-3

[20] Carchedi, 2001 p.16

[21] Ryner & Cafruny, 2017 p.168, 191

[22] Anderson, 2011 p.67-8

[23] Bauman, 2004 p.53-4

[24] Carchedi, 2001 p.161

[25] WTO, 2015 p.45

[26] Enlargement, 2015 p.3, DEVCO, 2016 p.4

[27] Hallstein, 1972 p.257-258

[28] Ryner & Cafruny, 2017 p.195-6

[29] Carchedi, 2001 p.215-6

[30] Ryner & Cafruny, 2017 p.198

[31] Ibid. p.198

[32] Ibid. p.200-1

[33] Streeck, 2014 p.146

[34] Enlargement, 2015 p.3

[35] Carchedi, 2001 p.19

[36] Enlargement, 2015 p.7

[37] Carchedi, 2001 p.186-8

[38] Ryner & Cafruny, 2017 p.189

[39] Tycner, 2016

[40] Zielonka, 2007 p.54-7

[41] Marquand, 2011 p.149

[42] Tsoukalis, 2016 p.129

[43] Kant, 1917

[44] Bauman, 2004 p.39-40

[45] Hayek, 1939 p.131-149

[46] Streeck, 2014 p.97-103, 146

[47] Anderson, 2011 p.31, 65-6, 190

[48] Kant, 1917 p.97-100

[49] Kautsky, 1984 p.180-1

[50] Bauman, 2004 p.45-6

[51] Carchedi, 2001 p.9